Physical Computation and Cognitive Science
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The first half of the paper argues that the anti-Intellectualist argument from cognitive science rests on a naturalistic approach to metaphysics: its proponents assume that We demonstrate that this fact has been overlooked in the ensuing debate, resulting in inconsistency and confusion. Defenders of the semantic approach to Intellectualism engage with the argument from cognitive science in a way that implicitly endorses this naturalistic metaphysics, and even rely on it to claim that cognitive science support Intellectualism. In the course of their arguments, however, they also reject that scientific findings can have metaphysical import.
We argue that this situation is preventing productive debate about Intellectualism, which would benefit from both sides being more transparent about their metaphilosophical assumptions. Knowledge How in Epistemology. Metaphysical Naturalism in Metaphysics. Naturalized Epistemology in Epistemology. According to an influential view, the detection of action possibilities and the selection of a plan for action are two segregated steps throughout the processing of visual information.
This classical approach is committed with the assumption that two independent types of processing underlie visual perception: the semantic one, which is at the service of the identification of visually presented objects, and the pragmatic one which serves the execution of actions directed to specific parts of the same objects. However, as our This paper sets out the details of a non-modularist approach to visual perception of action possibilities and explains how to resist the lure of cognitive segregation.
Perception and Action in Philosophy of Mind. Philosophy of Perception, General in Philosophy of Mind. Science of Consciousness in Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Computers have far to go to match human strengths, and our estimates will depend on analogy and extrapolation.
Fortunately, these are grounded in the first bit of the journey, now behind us. Thirty years of computer vision reveals that 1 MIPS can extract simple features from real-time imagery--tracking a white line or a white spot on a mottled background. The data fades there--research careers are too short, and computer memories too small, for significantly more elaborate experiments. Philosophy of Cognitive Science.
A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition
Supervenience, General in Metaphysics. Myin, A. Peeters, and F. Sprevak, and M. London: Routledge. The Hard Problem The Intentionality Problem is targeted against computationalism using non-semantic accounts of computation, arguing that it fails in explaining intentionality. Theion Problem claims that causal interaction between concrete physical processes and abstract computational properties is problematic. We argue that these a We contend that model replicability, or independent researchers' ability to obtain the same output using original code and data, and model reproducibility, or independent researchers' ability to recreate a model without original code, This means that measures designed to improve model replicability may not enhance and, in some cases, may actually damage model reproducibility.
We claim that although both are undesirable, low model reproducibility poses more of a threat to long-term scientific progress than low model replicability. In our opinion, low model reproducibility stems mostly from authors' omitting to provide crucial information in scientific papers and we stress that sharing all computer code and data is not a solution.
Reports of computational studies should remain selective and include all and only relevant bits of code. Explanation in Neuroscience in Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Robustness in Science in General Philosophy of Science. Scientific Method in General Philosophy of Science. In this paper, the Author reviewed the typical objections against the claim that brains are computers, or, to be more precise, information-processing mechanisms.
By showing that practically all the popular objections are based on uncharitable interpretations of the claim, he argues that the claim is likely to be true, relevant to contemporary cognitive science, and non-trivial. In this paper, I argue that computationalism is a progressive research tradition. Its metaphysical assumptions are that nervous systems are computational, and that information processing is necessary for cognition to occur.
First, the primary reasons why information processing should explain cognition are reviewed. Then I argue that early formulations of these reasons are outdated. However, by relying on the mechanistic account of physical computation, they can be recast in a compelling way. Next, I contrast two computational models of working memory The methodological assumptions of new modeling work are best understood in the mechanistic framework, which is evidenced by the way in which models are empirically validated.
Moreover, the methodological and theoretical progress in computational neuroscience vindicates the new mechanistic approach to explanation, which, at the same time, justifies the best practices of computational modeling. Overall, computational modeling is deservedly successful in cognitive science.
Its successes are related to deep conceptual connections between cognition and computation. Computationalism is not only here to stay, it becomes stronger every year.
Nir Fresco | Avant
I rehabilitate the receptor notion by augmenting it with a background condition: that natural representations are ascribed only to systems construed as organisms. The Organism-Receptor account raises some The mainstream view in cognitive science is that computation lies at the basis of and explains cognition. Our analysis reveals that there is no compelling evidence or argument for thinking that brains compute. It makes the case for inverting the explanatory order proposed by the computational basis of cognition thesis. We give reasons to reverse the polarity of standard thinking on this topic, and ask how it is possible that computation, natural and artificial, might be based on cognition and not Philosophy of Mind, Misc in Philosophy of Mind.
In this paper we give some formal examples of ideas developed by Penco in two papers on the tension inside Frege's notion of sense see Penco The paper attempts to compose the tension between semantic and cognitive aspects of sense, through the idea of sense as proof or procedure — not as an alternative to the idea of sense as truth condition, but as complementary to it as it happens sometimes in the old tradition of procedural semantics. Fregean Sense in Philosophy of Language. Fregean Theories, Misc in Philosophy of Language. Triviality arguments against the computational theory of mind claim that computational implementation is trivial and thus does not serve as an adequate metaphysical basis for mental states.
It is common to take computational implementation to consist in a mapping from physical states to abstract computational states. In this paper, I propose a novel constraint on the kinds of physical states that can implement computational states, which helps to specify what it is for two physical states to non-trivially implement the same Functionalism, Misc in Philosophy of Mind.
Multiple Realizability in General Philosophy of Science. The paper introduces an extension of the proposal according to which conceptual representations in cognitive agents should be intended as heterogeneous proxytypes. The main contribution of this paper is in that it details how to reconcile, under a heterogeneous representational perspective, different theories of typicality about conceptual representation and reasoning.
Introduction: Philosophy and Cognitive Science
In particular, it provides a novel theoretical hypothesis - as well as a novel categorization algorithm called DELTA - showing how to integrate the representational and reasoning assumptions of the theory-theory Computational Semantics in Philosophy of Cognitive Science.
Imagination, Misc in Philosophy of Mind. The Nature of Belief in Philosophy of Mind. Thought and Thinking, Misc in Philosophy of Mind.
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A recently proposed model of sensory processing suggests that perceptual experience is updated in discrete steps. We show that the data advanced to support discrete perception are in fact compatible with a continuous account of perception. Physiological and psychophysical constraints, moreover, as well as our awake-primate imaging data, imply that human neuronal networks cannot support discrete updates of perceptual content at the maximal update rates consistent with phenomenology.
A more comprehensive approach to understanding the physiology of perception and experience at Philosophy of Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind. Philosophy of Neuroscience in Philosophy of Cognitive Science. We argue that their proposal gives rise to at least three difficult problems.
The Emergic Network was designed to help realize systems undergoing continuous change. In this thesis, eight different filling-in phenomena are demonstrated under a regime of continuous eye movement and under static eye conditions as well. These can interact to raise Nevertheless, the model is robust and parameter free.
Differential re-use occurs in the nature of model interaction with a particular testing paradigm. The breadth of phenomenal behaviour covered is largely to lend credence to our novel decomposition. It helps cutting up of functionalism into finer-grains distributed over space by harnessing massive recurrence and over time by harnessing continuous change , yet simplifies by using standard computer code to focus on the interaction of information flows. Thus while the structure of the network looks neurocentric, the dynamics are best understood in flowcentric terms.
Surprisingly, dynamic system analysis as usually understood is not involved. An Emergic Network is engineered much like straightforward software or hardware systems that deal with continuously varying inputs. Ultimately, this thesis addresses the problem of reduction and induction over complex systems, and the Emergic Network architecture is merely a tool to assist in this epistemic endeavour.
It addresses the attribution problem of how much of a phenomenon is best explained at a sensory level of analysis, rather than at a perceptual one. As the causal information flows are stable under eye movement, we hypothesize that they are the locus of consciousness, howsoever it is ultimately realized.
Physical Computation and Cognitive Science
Aspects of Time, Misc in Metaphysics. Complexity in Philosophy of Physical Science. Computational Philosophy in Metaphilosophy. Conceptions of Information in Philosophy of Computing and Information. This classical view was also once thought to be damning for ecological accounts of perception.
Ecologists tend to shy away from computational and symbolic approaches to perceptual activity, stressing, instead, the importance of external and organismic factors.
In this talk, I explain how the development of different types of computational systems, and the evolution of our theorizing concerning them rescues an ecological, and yet computational way of thinking of perception. Mario Villalobos - 'Computational closure in biological systems: the cybernetic roots of cognition' In a conceptual and historical sense, cybernetics represents a common ancestor for computationalism and enactivism, two theoretical approaches that, despite this shared ascendant, have set and developed their respective research agendas in strong opposition.
In this talk, I review some basic cybernetic ideas with respect to biological cognition and analyze their significance for a possible via of reconciliation between computationalism and enactivism. Ron Chrisley Sussex University - title: tba. There is widespread agreement that an ecological approach to explaining behaviour is at odds with a computational approach. Often, this opposition is also framed in terms of representations such that ecological approaches are meant to be necessarily non-representational.
One, cognitive scientists tend to adopt an unnecessarily narrow view of computation compared to the wider scientific community. Two, the motivation for invoking representations in an explanation is unfairly reduced to solving a problem of poverty of stimulus, which is anathema to ecological explanations. We argue that the concept of representation is amenable to an ecological approach, as long as it is built upon a foundation of ecological information.
Ecological representations do not fill out impoverished sensory experiences. Their usefulness comes entirely from the extent to which they preserve spatiotemporal structure in information variables specifying biologically and psychologically relevant properties of the environment. Their job is to provide a mechanism by which behaviour can complement relevant properties of the environment in the absence of immediate perceptual access to those properties. The view is that somehow reality should be carved at its joints, and then made to correspond with the formal model.